**1AC -- Stability ADV**

#### ADVANTAGE ONE IS STABILITY --

**Oil shocks cause a great power war.**

**Qasem 7,** Islam Yasin  a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online: <http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm>

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, **superpowers will not hesitate** to unleash their economic and **military power** to ensure secure access to oil resources, **triggering worldwide** tension, if not armed **conflict.** And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of **using nuclear weapons** in pursues of national interests **are high.**

**Hotspots go nuclear.**

**Bosco, 6** – senior editor at Foreign Policy magazine (David, “Forum: Keeping an eye peeled for World War III” <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06211/709477-109.stm_>)

The understanding that small but violent acts can spark **global conflagration** is etched into the world's consciousness. The reverberations from Princip's shots in the summer of 1914 ultimately took the lives of more than 10 million people, shattered four empires and dragged more than two dozen countries into war. This hot summer, as the world watches the violence in the Middle East, the awareness of peace's fragility is particularly acute. The bloodshed in Lebanon appears to be part of a broader upsurge in unrest. Iraq is suffering through one of its bloodiest months since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. Taliban militants are burning schools and attacking villages in southern Afghanistan as the United States and NATO struggle to defend that country's fragile government. Nuclear-armed India is still cleaning up the wreckage from a large terrorist attack in which it suspects militants from rival Pakistan. The world is awash in weapons, North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear capabilities, and long-range missile technology is spreading like a virus. Some see the start of a global conflict. "We're in the early stages of what I would describe as the Third World War," former House Speaker Newt Gingrich said recently. Certain religious Web sites are abuzz with talk of Armageddon. There may be as much hyperbole as prophecy in the forecasts for world war. But it's not hard to conjure ways that today's hot spots could ignite. Consider the following scenarios: Targeting Iran: As Israeli troops seek out and destroy Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon, intelligence officials spot a shipment of longer-range Iranian missiles heading for Lebanon. The Israeli government decides to strike the convoy and Iranian nuclear facilities simultaneously. After Iran has recovered from the shock, Revolutionary Guards surging across the border into Iraq, bent on striking Israel's American allies. Governments in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia face violent street protests demanding retribution against Israel -- and they eventually yield, triggering a major regional war. Missiles away: With the world's eyes on the Middle East, North Korea's Kim Jong Il decides to continue the fireworks show he began earlier this month. But this time his brinksmanship pushes events over the brink. A missile designed to fall into the sea near Japan goes astray and hits Tokyo, killing a dozen civilians. Incensed, the United States, Japan's treaty ally, bombs North Korean missile and nuclear sites. North Korean artillery batteries fire on Seoul, and South Korean and U.S. troops respond. Meanwhile, Chinese troops cross the border from the north to stem the flow of desperate refugees just as U.S. troops advance from the south. Suddenly, the world's superpower and the newest great power are nose to nose. Loose nukes: Al-Qaida has had Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in its sights for years, and the organization finally gets its man. Pakistan descends into chaos as militants roam the streets and the army struggles to restore order. India decides to exploit the vacuum and punish the Kashmir-based militants it blames for the recent Mumbai railway bombings. Meanwhile, U.S. special operations forces sent to secure Pakistani nuclear facilities face off against an angry mob. The empire strikes back: Pressure for democratic reform erupts in autocratic Belarus. As protesters mass outside the parliament in Minsk, president Alexander Lukashenko requests Russian support. After protesters are beaten and killed, they appeal for help, and neighboring Poland -- a NATO member with bitter memories of Soviet repression -- launches a humanitarian mission to shelter the regime's opponents. Polish and Russian troops clash, and a confrontation with NATO looms. As in the run-up to other wars, there is today more than enough tinder lying around to spark a great power conflict. The question is how effective the major powers have become at managing regional conflicts and preventing them from escalating. After two world wars and the decades-long Cold War, what has the world learned about managing conflict? The end of the Cold War had the salutary effect of dialing down many regional conflicts. In the 1960s and 1970s, every crisis in the Middle East had the potential to draw in the superpowers in defense of their respective client states. The rest of the world was also part of the Cold War chessboard. Compare the almost invisible U.N. peacekeeping mission in Congo today to the deeply controversial mission there in the early 1960s. (The Soviets were convinced that the U.N. mission was supporting a U.S. puppet, and Russian diplomats stormed out of several Security Council meetings in protest.) From Angola to Afghanistan, nearly every Cold War conflict was a proxy war. Now, many local crises can be handed off to the humanitarians or simply ignored. But the end of the bipolar world has a downside. In the old days, the two competing superpowers sometimes reined in bellicose client states out of fear that regional conflicts would escalate. Which of the major powers today can claim to have such influence over Tehran or Pyongyang? Today's world has one great advantage: None of the leading powers appears determined to reorder international affairs as Germany was before both world wars and as Japan was in the years before World War II. True, China is a rapidly rising power -- an often destabilizing phenomenon in international relations -- but it appears inclined to focus on economic growth rather than military conquest (with the possible exception of Taiwan). Russia is resentful about its fall from superpower status, but it also seems reconciled to U.S. military dominance and more interested in tapping its massive oil and gas reserves than in rebuilding its decrepit military. Indeed, U.S. military superiority seems to be a key to global stability. Some theories of international relations predict that other major powers will eventually band together to challenge American might, but it's hard to find much evidence of such behavior. The United States, after all, invaded Iraq without U.N. approval and yet there was not even a hint that France, Russia or China would respond militarily.

**Failed states cause extinction and structural impacts.**

**Manwaring 05**--October 2005 (Retired U.S. Army colonel and an Adjunct Professor of International Politics at Dickinson College,

Max G. “VENEZUELA’S HUGO CHÁVEZ, BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM, AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE”) http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub628.pdf KY

President Chávez also understands that the process leading to **state failure is the most dangerous** long-term security challenge facing the **global community** today. The argument in general is that failing and failed state status is **the breeding ground** for **instability,** criminality, insurgency, **regional conflict,** and **terror**ism. These conditions breed massive humanitarian **disasters and** major **refugee flows.** They can host “evil” networks of all kinds, whether they involve criminal business enterprise, narco-trafficking, or some form of ideological crusade such as Bolivarianismo. More specifically, these conditions spawn all kinds of things people in general do not like such as murder, kidnapping, corruption, intimidation, and destruction of infrastructure. These means of coercion and persuasion can spawn further **human rights violations, torture, poverty, starvation, disease**, the recruitment and use of child soldiers, trafficking in women and body parts, trafficking and proliferation of conventional weapons systems and WMD, **genocide,** ethnic cleansing, warlordism, and criminal anarchy. At the same time, these actions are usually unconfined and spill over into regional syndromes of poverty, destabilization, and conflict.62¶ Peru’s Sendero Luminoso calls violent and destructive activities that facilitate the processes of state failure “armed propaganda.” Drug cartels operating throughout the Andean Ridge of South America and elsewhere call these activities “business incentives.” Chávez considers these actions to be steps that must be taken to bring¶ 22¶ about the political conditions necessary to establish Latin American socialism for the 21st century.63 Thus, in addition to helping to provide wider latitude to further their tactical and operational objectives, state and nonstate actors’ strategic efforts are aimed at progressively lessening a targeted regime’s credibility and capability in terms of its ability and willingness to govern and develop its national territory and society. Chávez’s intent is to focus his primary attack politically and psychologically on selected Latin American governments’ ability and right to govern. In that context, he understands that popular perceptions of corruption, disenfranchisement, poverty, and lack of upward mobility limit the right and the ability of a given regime to conduct the business of the state. Until a given populace generally perceives that its government is dealing with these and other basic issues of political, economic, and social injustice fairly and effectively, instability and the threat of subverting or destroying such a government are real.64¶ But failing and failed states simply do not go away. Virtually **anyone** can take advantage of such an unstable situation. The tendency is that the best motivated and best armed organization on the scene will control that instability. As a consequence, failing and failed states become dysfunctional states, rogue states, criminal states, narco-states, or new people’s democracies. In connection with the creation of new people’s democracies, one can rest assured that Chávez and his Bolivarian populist allies will be available to provide money, arms, and leadership at any given opportunity. And, of course, the longer dysfunctional, rogue, criminal, and narco-states and people’s democracies persist, the more they and their associated problems endanger global security, peace, and prosperity.

**Cuban instability causes multiple scenarios for extinction --- specifically causes hotspot escalation.**

**Gorrell 5** - Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074)

\*GWOT = Global War on Terrorism

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for **instability and civil war**. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a **refugee crisis**.¶ Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably.¶ In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be **forced** to deploy military forces to Cuba, **creating** the conditions for **an**other **insurgency.** The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems.¶ U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1)¶ The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? **The U.S. can little afford to be distracted** by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the **resources** to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that **Africa and the Caucasus** region are potential **hot spots** for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. **North Korea will** continue to **be a**n unpredictable **crisis** in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if **China resorts to aggression** to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to **war over Taiwan**? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

**US action is prerequisite to stability.**

**Cardenas 13**-- served in several foreign policy positions during the George W. Bush administration (2004-2009), including on the National Security Council staff, a consultant with Vision Americas in Washington, DC (Jose, 3/6, “The struggle for Venezuela’s future”, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/06/the\_struggle\_for\_venezuela\_s\_future) EL

The struggle for Venezuela's future begins now -- and the stakes couldn't be higher. The Obama administration can either stand by and watch the country become a satellite of the Castro regime promoting instability and maintaining dangerous alliances with Iran and other U.S. enemies, or it can try to influence events in a positive direction, meaning a return to constitutionality and a reformed electoral system that allows the Venezuelan people to freely and fairly determine their future. It will not be easy, given the amount of bad actors and levels of acrimony, polarization, and socioeconomic chaos that Hugo Chávez has left in his wake. Yet it presents an extraordinary opportunity to pull Venezuela back into the peaceful community of regional nations, after more than a decade of Chavez's trouble-making that has set back regional prospects for stability and economic development. What we know right now is that Chávez's successors evidently have decided to continue with their unconstitutional rule. Since the pliant supreme court waived the constitutional provision that the ailing Chávez had to be sworn-in last January for his next term, Vice President Nicolas Maduro, his appointed successor, has been Venezuela's de facto ruler. And, last night, Foreign Minister Elias Jaua announced that Maduro would continue as "interim" president. Yet, according to the constitution, in the absence of a duly sworn-in president, power should be transferred to the president of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, who is supposed to call new elections. It is well known, moreover, that Maduro and Cabello don't always see eye to eye. Maduro leads a faction of civilian ideologues seen as loyal to Cuba; Cabello, a former military colleague of Chávez, is not seen as trustworthy by the Castro regime, which sees the loss of Venezuelan oil subsidies as an existential threat. But Cabello maintains the active loyalty of important sectors in the Venezuelan armed forces. The Venezuelan opposition continues to insist that the constitution (which is of Chávez's own writing) be followed and have drawn up a list of simple electoral reforms that would level the playing field and better allow the Venezuelan people to chart their own future free of chavista and foreign interference. The United States cannot be an idle bystander in these crucial moments. First off, it cannot allow itself to be cowed by noisy Chávez supporters to allow events to simply unfold. It needs to stand on principle on behalf of an orderly transition consistent with the Venezuelan constitution. That means power being transferred to Cabello -- hardly an angel himself -- and the calling of new elections. And, this time, not Chávez-style elections -- with the vast expenditure of state resources, intimidation, and control of media -- but elections fully consistent with international standards, as the opposition is calling for. The next few days and weeks stand as a critical period during which the United States must reclaim its traditional leadership role in the Americas on behalf of democratic and free market development. This is not a role that can be out-sourced to Brazil, the Organization of American States, or anyone else. The administration must work urgently to rally hemispheric support for a constitutional transition in Venezuela under free and fair elections. It must go to Chávez's friends in Russia and China and tell them in explicit terms that subsidizing continuing subversion of the constitution in Venezuela is unacceptable. And it must make clear publicly that any Venezuelan officials seen to be doing so will be held accountable. Otherwise, a failure to lead means the certain continuation of a lawless government in cahoots with Cuba, Iran, and drug traffickers to the detriment of peace and regional security.

**Economic crisis causes Venezuela to become a failed state.**

**Ziff 10/9**—writer at the St. Andrews Foreign Review (Tamar, 2013, “Venezuela: Failed State in the Making?”, http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2013/10/venezuela-failed/) EL

“Venezuela sits nestled between Colombia and Guyana on the Caribbean coast of the South American continent. It is perhaps best known for its eccentric former president, Hugo Chavez. Chavez’s vitriolic anti-American rhetoric and foreign policy caprice made him an incredibly controversial figure on the global political stage, despised by the United States and its allies but hailed as a savior among many of his own people. Idiosyncrasy aside, the Chavez administration lies at the crux of Venezuela’s devolution from semi-functioning democracy to a now quasi-failed state. Chavez began his political career as an infantry commander, catapulted into the limelight after an attempted coup against the Carlos Perez administration in 1992. Though he failed to unseat Perez, the coup gave him the exposure he needed to formally enter politics at the head of his nascent populist party, the Movimiento Quinto Revolucionario (Fifth Republic Movement, or MVR). In 1998, Chavez ran for president and won by a solid margin, beginning a lengthy and tumultuous fourteen-year term that began and ended with little more than bombast. His election augured in a new and ambitious constitution, which, reflective of Chavez’s idolatry of socialist leader Simon Bolivar, changed the name of the country to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela as well as enshrining the extended rights of health, education, and employment. The 1999 constitution increased the power of the executive office, lengthening the presidential term time by one year and creating the possibility for consecutive re-election. A decade later, three years after a successful 2006 presidential campaign, Chavez put forth a referendum to abolish term limits, which passed with 54%[i] of the vote and in a sense formalized Chavez’s evident dictatorship. A year after obtaining a green light to become a lifelong president, Chavez gained the power to rule by decree for eighteen months from a rubber-stamp National Assembly. Shrewdly, Chavez had gone from legitimate political candidate to undisputed autocrat in a mere dozen years. Throughout all of his campaigns, Chavez was consistently plagued with accusations of election fraud from his opposition. However, no concrete evidence as to malpractice was ever revealed, and Chavez has garnered enough supporters to legitimise his role as head of state. Chavez’s domestic policy decisions were ostensibly beneficial: he nationalised the oil industry in 2001 with decree no. 1501, or the Hydrocarbons Organic Law, and used the revenues to fund social welfare programs that provided free and accessible healthcare and education to many Venezuelans[ii]. In fact, a 2011 report by the Organization of American States in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program called “Nuestra Democracia” (Our Democracy) noted that poverty in Venezuela decreased by over 20%, with extreme poverty mitigated by almost 10%. Chavez’s welfare initiatives garnered him considerable and enduring popularity, which manifested itself in the election of October 2012, in which Chavez won with almost 55%[iii] of the vote, a landslide victory against the liberal-reformist candidate, Henrique Capriles Radonski. Though Chavez’s welfare policies are lauded by both international organizations and his own citizens for their success in relieving poverty, his administration’s **impotence in** maintaining a functioning civic **infrastructure and** controlling the **crime** rate has **led** Venezuela **to the brink of failed-statehood.** Failed states have multiple distinguishing factors. According to leading political theorist Robert Rotberg, “Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by **internal violence** and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.”[iv] ‘Political goods’ encompass the duties that a government owes its people, namely the assurance and enforcement of **basic liberties**, such as those of life, speech, belief, and protest. First and foremost, a state must be able to ensure the security of its citizenry, for civil society can only burgeon when founded on the promise of preservation of life. Throughout Chavez’s 12-year presidency, Venezuela’s homicide rate skyrocketed, until by 2012 it had become the most violent country in South America. The lack of security and **widespread lawlessness** in Venezuela thus primes it for deterioration into failed statehood. Crime in Venezuela is further **exacerbated by infrastructural inadequacy**. By 2009, massive power outages and staple food shortages were plaguing the nation. The government began rationing necessities such as clean water, bread, and milk. Chavez’s administration had ostracised both American and international corporations to the extent that the few remaining multinationals were oil companies, and even those were beginning to distance themselves from the disastrous Venezuelan situation. A state-controlled exchange rate prevented the government from using monetary policy to fight inflation, leading to unsettling price fluctuations that, coupled with the scarcity of basic goods, left millions in the country destitute. Due to these factors, by the end of his third and last term as president, Chavez was facing a strong and angry liberal opposition that espoused the long-neglected ideals of democratic reform, civic accountability, and government transparency. On March 5th, 2013, Hugo Chavez died, leaving a divided, restless, and slowly imploding country. A follow-up election was, in strict accordance with the 1999 constitution, planned for the following month. Unsurprisingly, Chavez’s hand-picked successor, vice-president Nicolas Maduro, won the election and has since perpetuated the Chavista tradition of antagonism toward the United States, intolerance of dissent, and neglect of a rapidly disintegrating social fabric. Maduro even apes Chavista rhetoric, flinging almost farcical insults at the US head of state – Chavez labeled Obama “a poor ignoramus”[v], while Maduro chose to re-introduce the fire-and-brimstone allusion in calling the American President “the boss of the devils.”[vi] Try as he may, Maduro has not been able to capture the heart and minds of Chavez’s constituency. While Chavez defeated opposition leader Capriles in October by nearly 10% of the vote, the latter lost the April election against Maduro by a negligible amount, little more than 1%. Maduro fails to reaffirm Chavez’s charismatic legitimacy, fragmenting his political base and allowing the opposition to grow and consolidate against him. Failed states, fittingly enough, are characterized by the absence of trust in the political system and myriad insurgencies or warring factions that struggle to seize control of the nation. Though Venezuela has not devolved into such a condition, it is only a matter of time before a coup d’etat is attempted. Already, Maduro has led Venezuela further away from international oversight in his withdrawal from the American Convention of Human Rights, stereotypically lambasting it as an extension of United States’ authority. Domestically, the country is suffering from aggravated shortages and lengthening power outages, which the government has done little to address, citing sabotage as the cause of all woe. Protests are ravaging the capital city of Caracas, with schools and universities operating intermittently due to both perpetual unrest and continued indignation over the inadequacy of the Chavez-Maduro regime. Barring the occurrence of a miraculous rapprochement between Maduro and the opposition party, his inability to sustain popular support combined with an increasingly isolationist foreign policy will inevitably catalyse a stand-off between government forces and those who wish to pull Venezuela out of the darkness – literally. Strictly speaking, **Venezuela is not** as of **yet a “failed state.” But it is pretty damn close.**

**Venezuelan economic instability is coming -- collapse causes oil shocks and regional instability.**

**Noriega 11/26,** 2013, Roger, former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, former US ambassador to the OAS, assistant secretary of state under President George W. Bush. He is an American Enterprise Institute visiting fellow and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, which represents US and foreign clients, “Venezuela headed for chaos,” http://nypost.com/2013/11/26/venezuela-headed-for-chaos/)//DR. H

Venezuela is in a death spiral that could produce a crisis for the United States. Economic collapse, incompetent leadership and Cuban meddling may provoke a showdown among well-armed chavista rivals, with civilians caught in the crossfire. US diplomats, who’ve spent years ignoring or minimizing threats emanating from Venezuela, must act urgently to prevent a Syria scenario on our doorstep.

The late dictator Hugo Chávez left behind a mess: His divisive, illegitimate regime polarized society and devastated the economy. Inflation is running at 50 percent, while the vital oil sector is faltering. The bloated, bankrupt state can’t sustain the social spending that kept the peace; the nation already faces food shortages, power outages and rampant crime.

Chávez’s hapless successor, Nicolás Maduro, won disputed elections in April in what even he called a “Pyrrhic victory.” His mismanagement since has only hastened the country’s decline — for example, dealing with toilet-paper shortages by confiscating paper companies.

Maduro has resorted to accusing the Obama White House of plotting the collapse of the Venezuelan economy. He’s also created a “vice ministry of supreme social happiness” in an Orwellian gesture to tamp down widespread social anxiety. He even moved up Christmas celebrations up in advance of the Dec. 8 local elections.

Last week, Maduro publicly ordered retailers to lower prices on consumer goods. Security forces arrested dozens of shopkeepers and stood by as mobs emptied store shelves. Good luck seeing those shelves restocked. As he further tightens economic controls, Venezuelans will have to settle for what the government provides. Their only other choices: Flee the country, turn to crime — or oppose the regime.

Maduro is most worried about the last. He recently ordered the detention of several civic leaders who’d been mobilizing protest rallies. Regime sources say that he may even nix the upcoming elections and jail well-known opposition politicians.

Most blame these draconian measures on Maduro’s Cuban handlers, the puppeteers behind his rise to power. The destitute Castro regime’s survival depends on Venezuelan oil, so it means to keep Maduro in power by repressing popular unrest and ferreting out dissent — including within the regime.

By pushing Maduro to purge powerful chavistas — many with ties to the military — who disapprove of Havana’s heavy hand, the Cubans have likely overreached. This crackdown has stoked tension within the military between those aligned with Maduro and nationalists who’ve never been comfortable in a Cuban harness.

The regime has very little room to maneuver. Virtually every Venezuelan is infuriated by the daily fight for survival. The anti-chavistas are fed up with the harassment by an illegitimate and incompetent one-party state. All sides in the military are busy weighing their options.

Any act of repression, street brawl, electoral fraud or corruption scandal could unleash all the fury built up over the regime’s 15 years. Tragically, the sight of military units squaring off in the streets of Caracas is not a distant memory.

The United States imports about half the Venezuelan petroleum that it did when Chávez was elected in 1998, but that’s still 9 percent of our foreign oil purchases. Plus, an implosion of Venezuela’s economy — or, God forbid, prolonged civil warfare — will roil the international oil markets and destabilize the region when the US economy is sputtering.

What’s worse, in the last decade, Venezuela has become a narco-state, with dozens of senior officials and state-run enterprises complicit in the lucrative cocaine trade. The regime also is an ally of Iran and Hezbollah, which may find their own ways to exploit chaos in Venezuela.

Geography makes the bloodbath in Syria all but invisible to Americans, but Venezuela is a three-hour flight from Miami and No. 3 in the world in social networking. The US public will see photos and videos of innocent demonstrators mowed down in the street. Moreover, in the Americas, the United States will be expected to lead.

**Venezuelan stability’s a prerequisite to Cuban stability.**

**Osava 13**—Inter Press Service correspondent since 1978 (“Dependent on Venezuela’s Oil Diplomacy”, 3/18, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/03/several-countries-depend-on-venezuelas-oil-diplomacy/>) EL

RIO DE JANEIRO, Mar 18 2013 (IPS) - Venezuela’s economic challenges, more than the uncertainty over who will succeed late president Hugo Chávez, could **threaten** the oil diplomacy he practiced in the region. **Cuba** is the most obvious example. Oil imports from Venezuela cover half of the country’s energy needs, and have made Venezuela the Caribbean island **nation’s top** trading **partner.** Cuba’s foreign trade grew fourfold between 2005 and 2011, to 8.3 billion dollars. And Venezuela’s share of the total increased from 23 percent in 2006 to 42 percent in 2011, according to an online article by Cuban economist Carmelo Mesa, who lives in the United States. Cuba’s growing dependence on Venezuela has raised fears of a repeat of the severe shortage of essential goods, as well as frequent, lengthy blackouts, that Cuba suffered during the economic crisis of the 1990s triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European socialist bloc. Cuban economist Pável Vidal, a professor at the Javeriana Pontifical University in Cali, Colombia, said “Venezuela today represents around 20 percent of Cuba’s total trade in goods and services, while the Soviet Union represented 30 percent, and dependence was even stronger.” This means the actual risk is lower, although “a decline, even a gradual one, in the links with Venezuela would spark a recession,” he told IPS in an email exchange. He said an econometric projection indicates that a decline in Venezuela’s trade with Cuba could lead to a contraction of up to **10 percent of GDP and a** two to three year **recession** as a result of a drop in foreign revenue and investment, external financial restrictions, and more costly imports, without payment facilities for oil. A crisis of this kind would require “a complex and painful adjustment process,” Vidal said. But technological dependence is not as marked as it was with the Soviet Union, Cuba’s foreign trade has diversified, and Cuba now has a strong tourism industry, which did not previously exist, as well as new instruments of macroeconomic regulation, he added. However, the country is not in a position to weather a new crisis, he stressed. “Public wage earners and pensioners paid for the adjustments made to survive the crisis of the 1990s, but they could not do so today, because their buying power is just 27 percent of what is was in 1989,” Vidal said. Furthermore, the state, pressured by “growing foreign debt,” cut social spending, as reflected in a decline in health and education services. Against that backdrop, the economist said, it would be difficult to identify “who could shoulder the cost of a new crisis.”

**Brazil has influence on Venezuela and wants to prevent instability.**

**Romero 11/7,** Maria, 2013, “Brazil and Venezuela: The Discrete Fallout of Two Strategic Partners,” http://panampost.com/maria-teresa-romero/2013/11/07/brazil-and-venezuela-the-discrete-fallout-of-two-strategic-partners/)//DR**.** H

Why Dilma Rouseff Is Easing Back from the Weakening Maduro Regime

Since 2003, when Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva took office as president of Brazil, and under his successor Dilma Rousseff, commercial and diplomatic relations with Chavista Venezuela have been positive and close. The pair have been vital strategic partners, despite the undeniable political differences between both their governments.

These differences can be seen clearly in their foreign policies. In contrast with the ones implemented by Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, marked by their ideological bias, those favored by Lula and Rousseff have been more pragmatic; they are mainly based on economic interests and their traditional geo-strategic objective, to consolidate themselves as a regional and global power.

**This explains Brazil’s friendly but conditional stance towards Venezuela** during the Chavista regime. In fact, Brazilians have always refused to join the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA). It also explains why their bilateral relations, which had a golden era during Lula da Silva’s eight-year mandate, are now, under Dilma Rousseff, undergoing a subtle decline. This divide may deepen in the future due to the economic crisis and the political instability of Nicolás Maduro’s administration.

We should recall that it was in 2005, with Lula, when the “strategic alliance” was truly signed between Brasília and Caracas. Officials initiated agreements on a wide array of matters, quarterly meetings, and a cooperation facility. As these links strengthened, a very privileged partnership arose, which brought about an 858 percent increase in Brazilian exports to Venezuela. According to the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, total Brazil-Venezuela trade grew seven-fold from 2003 to 2012.

Regarding politics and diplomacy, though, President Lula signaled his distance from Chávez’s stance in matters that compromised Brazilian interests. For instance, during confrontations between the Commandante and George W. Bush’s administration in the United States and with the Colombian Álvaro Uribe, Lula acted as mediator or an appeaser with Chávez.

Still, Lula’s support for Chávez afforded the Venezuelan president international legitimacy. He did so through action or omission, sometimes with complicit silence, sometimes in a direct way or through his minister of foreign affairs, Celso Amorin, or his adviser Marco Aurelio García, who were in charge of his foreign policy.

With Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff, those fruitful bilateral relations have continued. Venezuela still accounts for 15 percent of Brazil’s total trade surplus. In 2012, their bilateral trade reached a record US$6.1 billion — although it favored Brazil steeply, where 80 percent of the traded goods and services came from. The energy sector accounted for Venezuela’s 20 percent (state-led).

Russeff and Maduro too have a cordial relationship. One of the Venezuelan president’s first visits this year, after his dubious electoral win, was to Brazil — and Brazil was one of the first countries to offer diplomatic acknowledgement. During the meeting, both leaders committed to sustaining their alliance and signed new agreements. Later, Brazilian authorities ensured that they would help Venezuela overcome the serious shortages it is currently experiencing.

Nevertheless, neither commercial nor diplomatic relations have been quite the same as those between Lula and Chávez. A political distancing and higher commercial pragmatism can be seen. Rousseff, more than Lula, acts on her own interests, which are those of an emerging power. Therefore, her stance changes according to the circumstances she faces. And she has critical internal issues to deal with — public demonstrations, popular unrest, partisan divisions, economic recession, etc. — although these are not as acute as those faced by her Venezuelan counterpart.

The disastrous economic situation in Venezuela is also a factor in Russeff’s growing apart. It was why, on October 28, she sent a mission to Caracas led by her minister of commerce and industry, Fernando Pimentel. He intended to claim the repayment of debts incurred by Venezuelan state firms with Brazilian exports companies, mainly in the food sector. According to the Folha de Sao Paulo newspaper, many payments of exports from Brazilian companies this year are already four months late.

Brazil’s subtle distancing is also due to the militarization and radicalization of Maduro’s administration. Rousseff and her Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores) are in a pre-electoral campaign period for the 2014 presidential elections, and her reelection is at stake. Therefore, she has no wish to be seen as having a close relationship with an undemocratic government that openly attacks the Constitution, the democratic opposition, and the rights of its citizens, including freedom of speech and information. Rousseff has repeatedly said that she prefers “the noise of newspapers to the silence of dictatorships.”

After all, Brazil is aware that it enjoys a democracy in which the media have a vigilant role and, in general terms, respect the democratic principles and institutions, plurality of voices, and human rights. It is also aware of its key status in South America — hence the caution against Maduro’s Chavismo. It is, after all, debased not only economically but also politically in the hemisphere and has long ceased to be the epicenter of the Latin American left.

**Venezuelan instability’s on the brink -- the condition of the plan is key -- absent it, instability spills over to the broader region.**

**Trinkunas 1/23,** Harold, Charles W. Robinson Chair and senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative in the Foreign Policy program, his research focuses on Latin American politics, particularly on issues related to democratization and security, 2014, “Venezuela Breaks Down in Violence,” http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/venezuela-breaks-down-violence-trinkunas)//DR. H

Summary and Recommendations

Economic mismanagement in Venezuela has reached such a level that it risks inciting a violent popular reaction. Venezuela is experiencing declining export revenues, accelerating inflation and widespread shortages of basic consumer goods. At the same time, the Maduro administration has foreclosed peaceful options for Venezuelans to bring about a change in its current policies.

President Maduro, who came to power in a highly-contested election last April, has reacted to the economic crisis with interventionist and increasingly authoritarian measures. His recent orders to slash prices of goods sold in private businesses resulted in episodes of looting, which suggests a latent potential for violence. He has put the armed forces on the street to enforce his economic decrees, exposing them to popular discontent.

Although the volume of crude oil that Venezuela supplies to the United States has declined in recent years, it is in the U.S. interest that Venezuela remain a reliable source of oil. Popular unrest in a country with multiple armed actors, including the military, the militia, organized crime and pro-government gangs, is a recipe for unwelcome chaos and risks an interruption of oil production. A violence-induced regime change in Venezuela would create a volatile situation **regionally.**

Our leverage is limited, given our poor relations with the Maduro administration. I therefore recommend that your administration begin a conversation now with others in the Americas on the situation in Venezuela, particularly with Brazil, whose interests are also at risk. While dysfunctional economic policies are the immediate threat, at its core Venezuela’s problem is one of a failure of democratic institutions. We should engage others to see if they can help steer a possibly chaotic situation toward one in which Venezuelans have the institutional mechanisms by which to influence their government to change course.

Background

Production by the national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), has been falling for over a decade due to underinvestment, poor maintenance and the loss of skilled workers. International investment in the oil sector has been deterred by erratic and arbitrary government policies. Further aggravating balance of payments problems, Venezuela sells a substantial amount of its oil at below market prices to China, Cuba, its allies in the Americas and its own citizens.

Dwindling oil revenues are a problem because oil constitutes over 95 percent of Venezuela’s exports, and two-thirds of food and consumer goods are imported. Hugo Chávez nationalized and then mismanaged many domestic industries, undermining local production. Maduro has since doubled down on these policies. In addition, his administration is increasingly financing the public sector by ordering the central bank to print more money. These policies produced the highest inflation rate in the world in 2013.

The government’s response to scarcity has been to decree price reductions and create government agencies to manage all imports. This produced a rush to acquire what consumer goods remain, compounding the already existing shortage of staples. The Maduro administration has promised that it will ensure sufficient imports, but it has a poor record with the large segments of the economy it already controls.

Venezuela still holds elections regularly, but the Maduro administration has undermined democratic institutions. It has centralized power in the executive branch, preventing other branches of government, opposition parties or civil society from influencing policy. State institutions are controlled by government supporters. Last November, the legislature gave Maduro essentially unlimited power to rule by decree. There are no checks on the executive when it uses state resources to win elections and selectively applies the law to intimidate opponents. Even when its opponents do win elections, the Maduro administration creates parallel governing institutions to route around them.

The risk of a violent outcome may still be low, but it will rise as the true extent of scarcity in Venezuela becomes apparent in the coming months. The threat to the Maduro administration may come from popular unrest, an effort by moderates in the government to oust the radicals and the president, or (least likely) a traditional coup. A now unified national opposition continues to emphasize elections as the solution, but the playing field is hardly level, and elections are not scheduled to take place again until 2015.

Ultimately, the armed forces are key to Maduro’s hold on power, but he lacks the charisma and insider knowledge that Chávez used to keep them loyal. He has placed the military on the street to enforce government decrees that may prove increasingly unpopular as scarcity deepens. The armed forces have been reluctant to engage in repression in the past; if there is popular unrest, they may return to their barracks rather than defend the government. Maduro has an insurance policy in the form of a loyalist militia and pro-government gangs known as “colectivos,” although their existence also means that any attempt to overthrow Maduro will quickly turn violent.

Violence in Venezuela would have international consequences, mainly through its potential to interrupt oil exports. Venezuela still supplies nearly one million barrels of crude per day to the United States, and it exports range as far as China and India. Venezuela is also a major supplier of energy to countries in the Caribbean and Central America. However, a chaotic outcome in Venezuela would also have a major impact on Colombia, both because Venezuela is an important consumer of Colombian exports and because of Venezuela’s role in Colombia’s peace negotiations with its insurgency.

There are few good options that could be taken to reduce the likelihood of violence. To begin with, we must bear in mind that the United States lacks the diplomatic tools, such as democracy assistance, to influence outcomes in Venezuela. Overt U.S. criticism of the Maduro administration or efforts to exert our limited economic leverage would be grist for the mill of the Venezuelan propaganda machine; we should avoid that.

The focus of our efforts thus should be to work with regional and international partners to both reduce the risk of violence and promote the restoration of full democracy. Unfortunately, the states with the most influence in Venezuela—China and Cuba—are the least likely to support change. The Organization of American States, which in the past played a stabilizing role, is hobbled by disagreements among member states, and this limits its ability to invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter to address the situation in Venezuela.

Brazil is both politically and economically influential in Venezuela, and it has enough at stake to want to avoid a chaotic outcome. We should encourage Brazil to push the Maduro administration to rethink its economic policies, press it to respect the checks and balances contained in Venezuela’s own constitution, and allow elected members of the opposition to fulfill their role in government. It will not be easy to secure this partnership with Brazil, given its preference for non-intervention and current distance from the United States over NSA surveillance issues. However, it offers the best available option under the current circumstances.

### 1AC -- Relations ADV

**ADVANTAGE TWO IS RELATIONS**

**Israel-Palestine war causes extinction -- risk of war is high.**

**Beres 11/11,** Louis, 2013, “The Future of Israel's Nuclear Deterrence: Debates about Iran and Palestinian statehood will have an effect on Israel's mode of self-defense,” http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/11/11/iran-israel-and-the-nuclear-threat-in-the-middle-east)//DR. H  
  
A Palestinian state would make Israel's conventional capabilities more problematic; it could thereby heighten the chances of **a regional nuclear war**. Although Palestine itself would obviously be non-nuclear, its overall strategic impact could nonetheless be magnified by continuously unfolding and more-or-less unpredictable developments in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Lebanon and elsewhere in this roiling and chaotic area.

A nuclear war could arrive in Israel not only as a "bolt-from-the-blue" surprise missile attack, but also as a result, intended or inadvertent, of escalation. If certain already extant enemy states were to begin conventional or biological attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem might respond, sooner or later, with aptly "proportionate" nuclear reprisals. Or, if these enemy states were to begin their aggressions with conventional attacks upon Israel, Jerusalem's own conventional reprisals might be met, in the future, with enemy nuclear counterstrikes.

For now, this would become possible only if a still-nuclearizing Iran were spared any final forms of Israeli or American preemptive interference, actions appropriately identifiable in law as "anticipatory self-defense." As a preemptive attack against Iran now seems operationally implausible, it is reasonable to assume that a persuasive Israeli conventional deterrent, at least to the extent that it would prevent enemy conventional and/or biological attacks in the first place, could reduce Israel's escalatory exposure to a nuclear war.

Pertinent questions arise. With its implicit ("deliberately ambiguous") nuclear capacities, why should Israel need a conventional deterrent at all? After all, even after Palestinian statehood, wouldn’t all rational enemy states desist from launching any conventional or biological attacks upon Israel out of an entirely sensible fear of Israeli nuclear retaliation?

Not necessarily. Aware that Israel would cross the nuclear threshold only in very extraordinary circumstances, these enemy states could be convinced – rightly or wrongly – that as long as their attacks remained recognizably non-nuclear, Israel would always respond in kind.

The only credible way for Israel to deter large-scale conventional attacks after the creation of Palestine would be by maintaining visible and large-scale conventional capabilities. Of course, enemy states contemplating any first-strike attacks using chemical or biological weapons are apt to take more seriously Israel's nuclear deterrent, whether newly-disclosed, or still "in the basement." A strong conventional capability is needed by Israel essentially to deter or to preempt conventional attacks, attacks that could, if they were undertaken, lead quickly via escalation to various forms of unconventional war.

However unforeseen, Palestine, already a "nonmember observer state" at the United Nations, would have measurably corrosive effects on power and peace in the Middle East. As, by definition, the creation of this particular Arab state would come at the territorial expense of Israel, the Jewish state's strategic depth would promptly and irretrievably diminish. Over time, Israel's conventional capacity to ward off enemy attacks could be commensurately reduced.

If certain enemy states were to perceive Israel's own sense of expanding weakness and possible desperation, this could imply a strengthening of Israel's nuclear deterrent. If, however, front-line enemy states did not perceive such an enhancement among Israel's decision-makers, these states, animated by Israel's conventional force deterioration, could be encouraged to attack. Paradoxically, for Israel, even the "successful" defeat of Arab/Islamic state enemies in an unconventional war could prove intolerable. Here, after all, the results of a nuclear war, or perhaps even a chemical or biological war, could prove calamitous for the "winner," as well as the "loser."

To be sure, a meaningful risk of regional nuclear war in the Middle East exists independently of any Palestinian state. Still, this unprecedented risk would be further enlarged if a 23rd Arab state were to appear more-or-less simultaneously with Iranian nuclear weapons. Above anything else, Israel must now do what is needed to prevent such coinciding and mutually-reinforcing and **existential perils.**

**Diseases cause extinction.**

**Casadevall 12,** Professor of Microbiology, Immunology, and the Division of Infectious Diseases at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Arturo, “The future of biological warfare,” Microbial Biotechnology, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1751-7915.2012.00340.x/pdf)//DR. H

Existential threats to humanity

In considering the importance of biological warfare as a subject for concern it is worthwhile to review the known existential threats. At this time this writer can identify at three major existential threats to humanity: (i) large-scale thermonuclear war followed by a nuclear winter, (ii) a planet killing asteroid impact and (iii) infectious disease. To this trio might be added climate change making the planet uninhabitable. Of the three existential threats the first is deduced from the inferred cataclysmic effects of nuclear war. For the second there is geological evidence for the association of asteroid impacts with massive extinction (Alvarez, 1987). As to an existential threat from microbes recent decades have provided unequivocal evidence for the ability of certain pathogens to cause the extinction of entire species. Although infectious disease has traditionally not been associated with extinction this view has changed by the finding that a single chytrid fungus was responsible for the extinction of numerous amphibian species (Daszak et al., 1999; Mendelson et al., 2006). Previously, the view that infectious diseases were not a cause of extinction was predicated on the notion that many pathogens required their hosts and that some proportion of the host population was naturally resistant.

However, that calculation does not apply to microbes that are acquired directly from the environment and have no need for a host, such as the majority of fungal pathogens. For those types of host–microbe interactions it is possible for the pathogen to kill off every last member of a species without harm to itself, since it would return to its natural habitat upon killing its last host. Hence, from the viewpoint of existential threats environmental microbes could potentially pose a much greater threat to humanity than the known pathogenic microbes, which number somewhere near 1500 species (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al.,2001), especially if some of these species acquired the capacity for pathogenicity as a consequence of natural evolution or bioengineering.

**Nuclear terrorism results in extinction.**

**Hellman, 08** [Martin E. Hellman, Professor @ Stanford, “Risk Analysis of Nuclear Deterrence” SPRING 2008 THE BENT OF TAU BETA PI, http://www.nuclearrisk.org/paper.pdf]

The threat of nuclear terrorism looms much larger in the public’s mind than the threat of a full-scale nuclear war, yet this article focuses primarily on the latter. An explanation is therefore in order before proceeding. A terrorist attack involving a nuclear weapon would be a catastrophe of immense proportions: “A 10-kiloton bomb detonated at Grand Central Station on a typical work day would likely kill some half a million people, and inflict over a trillion dollars in direct economic damage. America and its way of life would be changed forever.” [Bunn 2003, pages viii-ix]. The likelihood of such an attack is also significant. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has estimated the chance of a nuclear terrorist incident within the next decade to be roughly 50 percent [Bunn 2007, page 15]. David Albright, a former weapons inspector in Iraq, estimates those odds at less than one percent, but notes, “We would never accept a situation where the chance of a major nuclear accident like Chernobyl would be anywhere near 1% .... A nuclear terrorism attack is a low-probability event, but we can’t live in a world where it’s anything but extremely low-probability.” [Hegland 2005]. In a survey of 85 national security experts, Senator Richard Lugar found a median estimate of 20 percent for the “probability of an attack involving a nuclear explosion occurring somewhere in the world in the next 10 years,” with 79 percent of the respondents believing “it more likely to be carried out by terrorists” than by a government [Lugar 2005, pp. 14-15]. I support increased efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, but that is not inconsistent with the approach of this article. Because terrorism is one of the potential trigger mechanisms for a full-scale nuclear war, the risk analyses proposed herein will include estimating the risk of nuclear terrorism as one component of the overall risk. If that risk, the overall risk, or both are found to be unacceptable, then the proposed remedies would be directed to reduce which- ever risk(s) warrant attention. Similar remarks apply to a number of other threats (e.g., nuclear war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan). his article would be incomplete if it only dealt with the threat of nuclear terrorism and neglected the threat of full- scale nuclear war. If both risks are unacceptable, an effort to reduce only the terrorist component would leave humanity in great peril. In fact, society’s almost total neglect of the threat of full-scale nuclear war makes studying that risk all the more important. The cosT of World War iii The danger associated with nuclear deterrence depends on both the cost of a failure and the failure rate.3 This section explores the cost of a failure of nuclear deterrence, and the next section is concerned with the failure rate. While other definitions are possible, this article defines a failure of deterrence to mean a full-scale exchange of all nuclear weapons available to the U.S. and Russia, an event that will be termed World War III. Approximately 20 million people died as a result of the first World War. World War II’s fatalities were double or triple that number—chaos prevented a more precise deter- mination. In both cases humanity recovered, and the world today bears few scars that attest to the horror of those two wars. Many people therefore implicitly believe that a third World War would be horrible but survivable, an extrapola- tion of the effects of the first two global wars. In that view, World War III, while horrible, is something that humanity may just have to face and from which it will then have to recover. In contrast, some of those most qualified to assess the situation hold a very different view. In a 1961 speech to a joint session of the Philippine Con- gress, General Douglas MacArthur, stated, “Global war has become a Frankenstein to destroy both sides. … If you lose, you are annihilated. If you win, you stand only to lose. No longer does it possess even the chance of the winner of a duel. It contains now only the germs of double suicide.” Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ex- pressed a similar view: “If deterrence fails and conflict develops, the present U.S. and NATO strategy carries with it a high risk that Western civilization will be destroyed” [McNamara 1986, page 6]. More recently, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn4 echoed those concerns when they quoted President Reagan’s belief that nuclear weapons were “totally irrational, totally inhu- mane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization.” [Shultz 2007] Official studies, while couched in less emotional terms, still convey the horrendous toll that World War III would exact: “The resulting deaths would be far beyond any precedent. Executive branch calculations show a range of U.S. deaths from 35 to 77 percent (i.e., 79-160 million dead) … a change in targeting could kill somewhere between 20 million and 30 million additional people on each side .... These calculations reflect only deaths during the first 30 days. Additional millions would be injured, and many would eventually die from lack of adequate medical care … millions of people might starve or freeze during the follow- ing winter, but it is not possible to estimate how many. … further millions … might eventually die of latent radiation effects.” [OTA 1979, page 8] This OTA report also noted the possibility of serious ecological damage [OTA 1979, page 9], a concern that as- sumed a new potentiality when the TTAPS report [TTAPS 1983] proposed that the ash and dust from so many nearly simultaneous nuclear explosions and their resultant fire- storms could usher in a nuclear winter that might erase homo sapiens from the face of the earth, much as many scientists now believe the K-T Extinction that wiped out the dinosaurs resulted from an impact winter caused by ash and dust from a large asteroid or comet striking Earth. The TTAPS report produced a heated debate, and there is still no scientific consensus on whether a nuclear winter would follow a full-scale nuclear war. Recent work [Robock 2007, Toon 2007] suggests that even a limited nuclear exchange or one between newer nuclear-weapon states, such as India and Pakistan, could have devastating long-lasting climatic consequences due to the large volumes of smoke that would be generated by fires in modern megacities. While it is uncertain how destructive World War III would be, prudence dictates that we apply the same engi- neering conservatism that saved the Golden Gate Bridge from collapsing on its 50th anniversary and assume that preventing World War III is a necessity—not an option.

**Cyberterrorism is feasible and results in escalatory nuclear warfare.**

**Fritz 09,** Jason, Masters in International Relations, Researcher for International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2009, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control,” http://icnnd.org/Documents/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.pdf)//DR. H

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another, thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power. This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. **Continuing** difficulties in **developing computer tracking technologies** which **could** trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to **reduc**ing **the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals.**¶ All computers which are connected to the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods, such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental technology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options, such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable, perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system.¶ Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, **transportation could be shut down**, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction. Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses. For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response. These false claims could be posted directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising command and control centres directly.

**Terrorism is highly likely in the Tri-Border Area -- prefer expert consensus.**

**Trevisi 13,** A.F., Research Assistant at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, October 2013, http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=4u2-oK2D\_TM%3d&tabid=66)//DR. H

Terrorism in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) has become a salient, highly-publicized issue. The region is frequently called a counterfeit capital, crime hub, and breeding ground for terrorists. Analyzing terrorist activities, operatives, and groups established in the triple frontier requires an introductory description of its particular background. Part 1 outlines the geographical features of the frontier area where Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina meet, as well as the specificities of the three main urban centers: Foz do Iguaçu, Ciudad del Este, and Puerto Iguazú. It also expounds the socioeconomic elements that characterize the region, including its different ethnic minorities, religious groups, and economic activities. It includes a section on the area’s black-market economy and the role played by the Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este. These general characteristics make the TBA a potential safe haven and breeding ground for terrorists.

Subsequently, Part 2 attempts to evaluate the main components of the regional terrorist threat – the groups and their activities. Even though the existence of terrorist cells is frequently debated, there is a general **consensus** among security forces that terrorists operate in the TBA. Most of the available texts focus on the presence of Hezbollah and al Qaeda, despite the identification of Hamas, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, al-Jihad, al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, Jihad Media Battalion, and Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group operatives in the region. These organizations engage in varied fundraising, recruiting, training and violent activities in the triple frontier. Their capability was alarmingly demonstrated with the TBA-linked bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.

In Part 3, this report attempts to explain how the operational capabilities of the terrorist organizations are improved by the extension of their regional network and their collaboration with criminal organizations. These factors intensify the threat posed by terrorists operating in South America. Finally, the last part analyzes the efforts that have been undertaken to combat crime and terrorism in the TBA. National, regional and international actors have collaborated in the development of a regional security network. Nevertheless, the fight against terror remains incomplete and riddled with limitations. In order to eradicate terrorism from the triple frontier and the South American continent, the TBA nations will need to implement a more comprehensive counterterrorist strategy.

**Brazil’s a hot-cyber mess.**

**Volcsko 1/16**/14, Ben, Research Assistant at the Monterrey Institute of International Studies, httpr://sites.miis.edu/cysec/2014/01/16/profile-of-brazils-overall-cyber-security-situation/)//DR. H

Brazil is often known for its coastal beauty but sadly it should also be recognized for its prolific cyber security concerns. According to Symantec, Brazil is listed as number 7 on their list of countries with the biggest cybercrime problems. Despite investing significant amounts of money into cyber start-ups and establishing cooperative cyber security agreements with Argentina, India and Russia, Brazil is still struggling to overcome the persisting challenge that cyber-criminals present. On top of this, Brazil has recently taken a hardliner stance against the U.S. following the revelations of Edward Snowden. Brazil has actively supported the U.N.’s Cyberprivacy Agreement and begun taking steps to bypass the U.S.-operated underwater cable systems in order to reduce their dependence on who they now perceive to be false friends. It appears that Brazil, however, is focused on the wrong issues as they still need to overcome large numbers of internal banking Trojans and substantial gaps within their cyber security dynamics. Some experts even claim that Brazil’s current security posture is so poor that they are wide open to cyber-invasion. Brazil has also taken steps to introduce cloud technology into their government networks which could magnify problems in their current state. On a positive note, Brazil is now realizing that effective policy and law for responding to cybercrime is necessary. Hopefully Brazil will follow-up these legislative acts with improvements in their cyber security practices to provide some teeth for their new resolve.

**US-Brazil relations mitigate diseases.**

**Sweig et al 11** (Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, AND Samuel W. Bodman, and James D. Wolfensohn, Chairmen, Wolfensohn & Company, LLC) (“Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations” Council on Foreign Relations Task Force Report, July 12, 2011, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil\_TFR\_66.pdf //BLOV)

The Task Force urges action within the U.S. Congress to allow tech¬nology transfer to accompany Brazilian purchases of U.S. military equipment. These transfers would boost bilateral trade, U.S. industry, and defense cooperation and simultaneously support Brazil’s technology and innovation agenda.

Brazil’s investment in health research is providing tangible ben¬efits and important successes in developing **interventions for disease**, including HIV/AIDS and the so-called neglected diseases that dispro-portionally affect low- and middle-income countries (such as malaria, tuberculosis, and leprosy). The Task Force encourages the U.S. Depart¬ment of Health and Human Services and the National Institutes of Health to foster partnerships with their Brazilian counterparts to help build global health capacity and collaborate in scientific research projects that could help generate **novel diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines.**

**Brazilian diplomatic influence internationally resolves an Israel-Palestine conflict.**

**Datz and Peters, 13** – Giselle Datz is an Assistant Professor of Government and International Affairs at the School of Public and International Affairs, Joel Peters is

Professor of Government and International Affairs at the School of Public and International Affairs, Virginia Tech (“Brazil and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict in the New Century: Between Ambition, Idealism, and Pragmatism,” Israel Journal of foreign Affairs VII : 2 (2013) <http://israelcfr.com/documents/7-2/7-2-5-GiselleDatz-and-JoelPeters.pdf)//HAL>

Brazil’s approach to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has remained true to the course set by President Lula. Brazil under Dilma Rousseff has continued to be a strong and vocal advocate of Palestinian statehood. Shortly before the November 29, 2012 vote on Palestinian membership in the United Nations, Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota visited Israel and the Palestinian territories, where he reaffirmed Brazil’s willingness to help mediate a resolution to the conflict. At home, in December 2012, Brazil hosted the Forum Social Palestina Livre [World Social Forum for a Free Palestine], a gathering of political activists, civil society groups, and transnational networks organized by supporters of the ruling Workers’ Party. Brazil’s promotion of the Palestinian cause serves its interests at home and overseas. Domestically, it speaks to the idealism and principles of the Workers Party, which has held power since 2003. Abroad, it offers Brazil greater visibility, not only reflecting its ambitions of becoming a global player, but also forming a central element in Brazil’s efforts in challenging American dominance, and in promoting multilateralism to address and resolve global issues, thereby increasing the relevance of new emergent powers. But if we are witnessing the emergence of a “post-American” global order, then Brazil’s engagement with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict also reveals that pragmatism and self-interest will feature prominently in the approach of “new” powers to the resolution of global conflicts. Brazil has sought to strengthen its relations with Israel. For all its support of the Palestinian cause, Brazil sees Israeli investment, its high-tech sector, and the procurement of Israeli technology and advanced weapons as critical in the continued modernization of its economy and the development of its military exports. This sense of pragmatism and realpolitik has also guided Israel’s approach to Brazil. Recognizing Brazil’s importance as an economic actor and emerging global power, and its potential as a market for its military exports, and aware that it has little chance of affecting Brazil’s position, Israel has chosen to overlook its rhetoric on the conflict and work with Brazil, not against it. Indeed, Brazilian–Israeli relations have never been stronger. Since Rousseff came to power two years ago, five Israeli ministers have visited Brazil. Trade between the two countries has continued to flourish and Israeli military and security companies have deepened their presence in the growing Brazilian homeland security and defense markets. In April 2012, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, one of Israel’s leading defense contractors, acquired a 40-percent stake in the Brazilian aerospace company GESPI Aeronautics, and that summer the commander of the Brazilian air force paid a visit to Israel to discuss areas of future cooperation. At least until the end of Rousseff’s term in office (2015), we are likely to see the pattern of Brazil’s engagement with Israel and the Palestinians remain one that meshes ambition, idealism, and pragmatism in a more assertive foreign policy agenda that, for all its normative flavor, is ultimately grounded in material self interest. In that respect, it is a pattern of foreign policy behavior that is not too dissimilar to that of other emerging powers.

**Brazil’s key -- its overall influence plays a crucial role in the Middle East.**

**Meyer 13** 2/27/13 (Peter J. Meyer Analyst in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service) (“CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Brazil-U.S. Relations” February 27, 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf //BLOV)

In addition to seeking greater influence within global governance institutions, Brazil has pushed for a greater role in resolving issues of geopolitical importance. During the Lula Administration, Brazil was somewhat critical of the U.S. role in **the Middle East**, arguing that the U.N. should oversee negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and emerging powers should be more involved.77 Brazil hosted the presidents of Israel and the Palestinian National Authority, and suggested that it might be able to act as a **mediator in the conflict.** Brazil also recognized Palestine as an independent state within its 1967 borders, setting off a wave of similar recognitions throughout South America.78 At the September 2011 U.N. General Assembly, President Rousseff called for Palestine’s full membership in the United Nations.79

Additionally, Brazil has been involved in discussions regarding **Iran’s nuclear program.** In May 2010, Lula worked with his Turkish counterpart to negotiate a deal with Iran under which Iran’s enriched uranium would be reprocessed outside the country. The so-called “Tehran Declaration” was similar to a deal put forward in October 2009 by the United States, France, and Russia that had been supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Brazilians saw the agreement as a confidence-building measure to bring Iran back to the negotiating table; however, the Obama Administration and European nations viewed the agreement as a delaying tactic, noted that the October 2009 deal was no longer sufficient since Iran had continued to enrich uranium, and pushed ahead with sanctions.80 Brazil voted against U.N. Security Resolution 1929 (June 2010), saying the council had “lost a historic opportunity to peacefully negotiate the Iranian nuclear program,” but agreed to abide by the sanctions.81 While some analysts dismissed Brazil’s efforts as naive and unhelpful,82 others argued that the **negotiation attempt demonstrated Brazil’s growing prominence and the potential for new states to play important roles in resolving issues of geopolitical importance.**83

**US-Brazil diplomatic cooperation spills up to security coop -- specifically in the Tri-Border Region -- that solves terrorism and drug trafficking.**

**Brown 12,** Lieutenant Colonel,Thesis for Master of Strategic Studies (Lawrence T., 3/23/12, “Restoring the Unwritten Alliance in Brazil-United States Relations,” pdf)//DR. H

Brazil’s regional activism enables the United States to focus its diminishing foreign aid budget on the unstable parts of the developing world. These proposed¶ diplomatic initiatives are good faith measures crafted to lay the groundwork for greater¶ friendship. They should allay Brazilian concerns regarding sovereignty and reciprocity. ¶ Additionally, more positive U.S. – Brazil relations will facilitate future bilateral cooperation on economic and defense measures regionally and throughout the world.

Military Recommendations

Strengthened military relations naturally flow from improved diplomatic ones. As regional leaders, the United States and Brazil can focus their combined security efforts and resources against common threats to the two nations—and to the entire Western Hemisphere. Intelligence sharing during the upcoming World Cup and Olympic games, coordinated counterterrorism measures in the Tri-Border Area, and disrupting narco-trafficking between South America and Africa are among the more pressing security cooperation initiatives that can bring greater security to both countries and to the hemisphere. Close security and defense cooperation in the future, absent the historic shadow of U.S. imperialism, will help in re-establishing the “Unwritten Alliance” dynamic between the United States and Brazil that flourished in the first half of the 20th Century.

When Brazil hosts the World Cup and Olympics in a couple of years, it is in the U.S. national interest to assist Brazil’s efforts in countering terrorism, curbing drug trafficking, and reducing international crime. This United States provided similar support to South Africa during the World Cup in 2010 – assisting the prevention of devastating terrorist attacks on that world stage. Averting another “Munich” is certainly in the interest of the United States and indeed of all world sporting events. For the 2010 World Cup, South African security services benefited from security grants and extensive training: “Specifically, Anti-Terrorism Assistance has provided Underwater Explosive, Critical Incident, and Special Events Management, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and related equipment training.”42 Both the 2006 World Cup in Germany and the following one in South Africa transpired successfully with low-key U.S. security assistance. There were no terrorist attacks, despite ongoing large-scale operations against terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan at the time. When President Obama visited Brazil in 2011, one of the agreements resulting from the trip was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and Brazil concerning world sporting events cooperation. Security was one of the MOU’s six focus areas of cooperation. This MOU is foundational for the U.S. Department of State and Defense to provide any future support desired by the Brazilian government.43

One of the great strengths of the United States resides in its intelligence databases, whose holdings and effectiveness have grown substantially since 9/11. For the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Summer Olympics in Brazil, an intelligence sharing mechanism would help deter terrorism threats. Successful physical or virtual sharing could continue afterwards to address other regional security threats, such as drug trafficking or organized crime. Of course, extending temporary intelligence sharing after the world sporting events may be problematic due to Brazilian memory from its authoritarian past, when the military regime collected intelligence to deter internal dissent.44 U.S. officials have the next four years to convince the Brazilian government of its benign intentions. With less than two years before the opening kick of 2014 World Cup, beta testing of this provisional intelligence sharing arrangement should begin immediately to track terrorist threats likely to originate in the “Tri-Border Area” of South America.

Exposed Southern Flank

The United States has long worried about the “Tri-Border Area” (The TBA is the name given to the area surrounding the border shared between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay). In these border towns, laws are minimally enforced, money is laundered, and weapons, drugs, and people are trafficked. Organized crime and Islamic extremism have thrived there due to a lack of effective law enforcement from the three border nations.45 Concerns increased after 9/11 that Al-Qaeda could transit potentially porous borders, perhaps through Mexico, to attack U.S. interests in North America.46 Today, as the specter of war with Iran rises because of its purported pursuit of nuclear weapons, the concern has moved from devastating attacks from Al-Qaeda to devastating attacks from Hezbollah and its patron Iran. As recently as October 2011, Iran was accused of authorizing and financing an assassination attempt against the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States and of contemplating further attacks in Argentina.47 Successful terrorist attacks against Argentina were carried out in 1992 and 1994 by a Hezbollah militant organization supported by Iran. Terrorists exploited the TBA during each operation.48 The most telling evidence of potential terrorist attacks out of the TBA surfaced during a Hezbollah militiaman’s interview by the Spanish television station Telemundo. During the interview, the Hezbollah militant stated emphatically that if the United States attacked Iran, then Hezbollah would conduct retaliatory attacks inside the United States.49 One counterterrorism expert, Edward Luttwak, described Hezbollah’s most important base outside Lebanon as the TBA from which they have already supported terrorist attacks: “The northern region of Argentina, the eastern region of Paraguay and even Brazil are large terrains, and they have an organized training and recruitment camp for terrorists.”50

The historical evidence of terrorist activity emanating from the TBA is chilling. If the current crisis with Iran is not resolved by the time of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, then the Brazilian government will need substantial help in preventing potential terrorist attacks to disrupt games that will attract a global audience. Even now, Hezbollah terrorists may be inclined to strike at Israeli or American targets in the Western Hemisphere in retaliation for a recent UNSC resolution that placed additional sanctions on Iran. Hezbollah attacked its targets in Argentina for lesser reasons in 1992 and 1994.51 This is why intelligence sharing with Brazil must start now. The last time the United States held a 3+1 Group Meeting (Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and the United States) on TBA security was in 2004.52 This Group should re-convene at the earliest opportunity to assess the current terrorist threat within the TBA and to determine the probabilities of Hezbollah becoming operational if Iran is attacked.53 Nevertheless, collaborative intelligence initiatives must extend to the World Cup and Olympic timeframes if Iran continues to violate UNSC resolutions concerning its nuclear program. It is in both countries national interests to prevent attacks against their homeland. Certainly, Brazil does not want its territory utilized as a springboard for attacks within the region. Full cooperation in this security arena will assist in preventing the unthinkable until the Iran crisis over-dual use nuclear material is resolved.

Narco-Terrorist Connection

Cooperation in breaking the Brazil—West Africa narcotics connection is another area where national interests converge. In 2009, Brazil became the primary embarkation point for South American cocaine headed for West Africa. In West Africa, “there is evidence by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) that Latin American traffickers are collaborating with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Hezbollah to smuggle cocaine to Europe.”54 The Executive Director of the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) also confirmed that terrorists from Africa used money from drug trafficking to resource operations, purchase equipment, and provide salaries for their ranks.55 It is common knowledge that the United States conducts counterterrorist operations against AQIM, and seeks to stop any funding derived from the transshipment of cocaine from Latin America. Although Brazil itself does not produce significant amounts of cocaine, it does have 10,500 miles of mostly unsecured coastline. In addition, three of the world’s top producers of cocaine border Brazil: Columbia, Peru, and Bolivia. Brazil has invested more heavily in enforcing its borders since the economic boom, but the United States could assist by continuing the same intelligence sharing mechanism that has been proposed for the World Cup and Olympics. Additionally, Brazil’s unmanned aerial surveillance (UAS) program is currently in its infancy; it could benefit from the experience and systems of the mature U.S. programs.56 Building on the predicted intelligence successes of the World Cup and Olympics, this cooperation could perhaps expand to neighboring countries. Eventually, it could evolve into a hemispheric security network serving the national interests of all participating nations.

**US-Brazil relations are low -- the condition of the plan through Brazil reinvigorates US relations with Brazil and the broader region.**

**Kingstone 09,** Peter, Associate professor of political science at the University of Connecticut, 1/12/09, “Brazil: The Sleeping Giant Awakens?” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/3145/brazil-the-sleeping-giant-awakens)//DR. H

Implications for U.S. Policy

U.S.-Latin American relations have suffered from deep neglect over the past eight years, and therefore the Obama administration faces opportunities for reconstructing the relationship almost by default. Brazil could and should be the most valuable partner for the United States. Whatever weaknesses the country faces economically and politically, it remains a big country with a big economy. As long as the Brazilian economy remains stable and avoids a return to the chaos and volatility of the 1980s and 90s, then Brazil will continue to be a country to be reckoned with.

Lula's time in office is coming to a close and as yet there is no clear successor. Regardless, however, it is unlikely that Brazilian foreign policy will change much. Lula's foreign policy agenda differed from the past mostly in its ambitiousness. The country's foreign policy elite, housed in Itamaraty, the foreign affairs ministry, is highly professional and strongly nationalist, and helps to maintain a consistent and competent presence in foreign affairs.

Perhaps most importantly, Brazil continues to be the United States' best option to find a reasonable and serious interlocutor with, and a crucial balance to, Chávez. The key is a different approach to the region. Brazil's often thorny trade disputes with the U.S. rest on reasonable concerns. As a developing country, Brazil cannot and will not expose its manufacturing sector to uncontrolled competition, because its domestic producers face structural limits to competitiveness and a large percentage of the economy depends on its continued existence. At the same time, U.S. demands for openness on manufacturing are not matched by a similar flexibility on agricultural protectionism. As a result, U.S. positions are sometimes perceived as arrogant and unfair.

If the U.S. continues to approach Brazil in this manner, it is likely to continue to face Brazilian skepticism and resistance. However, on larger matters, the U.S. and Brazil have common interests. Expanded trade is one of them, since after decades of a closed economy Brazil has taken up the mantle of trade in earnest. Moreover, Brazilian skepticism of the United States does not even compare to Venezuelan or Bolivian hostility. Brazil's approach to Venezuela -- essentially to walk quietly and try to outmaneuver Chávez -- represents another possible line of common interest. Brazil and the U.S. also have the possibility of working together to promote support for democracy -- another common interest.

Brazil's model may face weaknesses. Its soft power, while sufficient to complicate the U.S. agenda or thwart its objectives, is not great enough to construct any real alternative to cooperation with the United States. But Brazil is not going away as a major player in the region. With some U.S. understanding and respect for Brazil's legitimate concerns, the door is open for an effective and cooperative relationship.

**The plan’s key to Brazilian diplomatic influence globally, Brazil says yes and the condition creates a trilateral cooperative venue with Venezuela.**

**Brown, 12** [Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence T. Brown, Restoring the “Unwritten Alliance” in Brazil—United States Relations, Strategy Research Project, 3-23-12, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560773>]

Brazil’s Initiative for Cooperation

The last area of convergence and cooperation is not an American one, but a Brazilian one. Brasília is as interested as the United States in a stronger relationship. The former Brazil Foreign Minister who is now the Defense Minister, Celso Amorin, recognized that there was enormous potential for structured cooperation between Brazil and the United States in areas of the world like Africa where there is great need for development and stability.57 Minister Amorin has cited the trilateral cooperation ¶ agreement among Brazil, Guinea-Bissau, and the United States as an example of ¶ productive cooperation. This was a first of its kind agreement for the United States and Brazil in Africa. 58

These trilateral agreements make strategic sense because bilateral agreements between the United States and relatively poor countries usually elicit criticism that the world’s only superpower is engaging in exploitive neo-colonialism. ¶ Having itself been a Portuguese colony, Brazil is viewed as a moderating influence on perceived expansive U.S. foreign policy. Brazil is also considered a friendly observer to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) of 120 countries that are distrustful of superpower diplomacy.59

Plainly spoken, if Brazil is part of an U.S. agreement with an impoverished¶ country, that country feels more comfortable making an agreement with the United States because Brazil, a guarantor of U.S. intentions, is part of it. Brazil welcomes this role because it enhances its position as a regional and world leader, establishes a ¶ singularly special diplomatic relationship with the United States, and fulfills two of¶ Brazil’s foreign policy action areas.¶ 60 And its role as a third party broker does not end ¶ with Africa or other poor regions. Brazil sees itself as a viable broker for peace as evidenced with its last-ditch diplomatic effort with Iran that attempted to resolve the uranium processing crisis.61¶ Minister Amorin shared his idea to expand trilateral frameworks to Secretary Clinton during President’s Rousseff’s inauguration. Although she seemed open to it at ¶ the time, there is no evidence of further action.¶ 62 An opportunity presented, one hopes ¶ that this was not an opportunity missed with Brazil. It aligns impeccably with President ¶ Obama’s pursuit of more partnerships and greater burden-sharing.

### 1AC -- Plan

#### The United States federal government should increase its economic engagement with Venezuela if and only if Brazil pressures Venezuela to rethink its economic policies, respect a “checks and balances” based government, and allow elected members of the opposition to fulfill their role in government.